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Abstract—Key generation is an important challenge among the
issues related to security in wireless sensor network. Each node
has a set of keys called key-chain rather than a single shared key.
The key-chains are generated at the base station and stored in the
ROMs of sensor nodes prior to deployment. This paper brings in
the idea of deterministic approach to key generation. There is no
need to assume a probability that any two nodes are neighbors.
We use combinatorics based approach using a block design
technique called symmetric Balanced Incomplete Block Design
(BIBD). We construct multiple key-spaces out of a key pool
from which the key-chains are formed. The main contribution to
this work is the use of multiple key spaces to decrease memory
utilization at each sensor node, retain connectivity and still not
hamper the resilience of the network. It decreases the redundancy
in key generation. It eliminates the dependency between the
number of keys in the key-chain and number of nodes in the
network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks consist of many tiny sensor nodes
deployed at a high density over region requiring surveillance
and monitoring. The sensor nodes typically consist of one
or more sensing elements, battery, low powered radio trans-
mitter/receiver, microprocessor and limited memory. Sensor
networks deployed in a hostile environment are prone to
malicious attacks like eavesdropping, masquerading, traffic
analysis etc. Hence, security is more important in sensor
networks than in traditional networks.
To provide security, communication between nodes should
be encrypted and authenticated. Encryption and authentication
algorithms require that the communicating nodes share a secret
key. The problem here is how to set up secret keys between
communicating nodes? This problem is known as the key
agreement problem. There are basically three types of general
key agreement schemes: trusted server scheme, self-enforcing
scheme and key pre-distribution scheme. The trusted server
scheme depends on a trusted server for key agreement between
nodes. E.g. Kerberos [1]. There is no trusted infrastructure
in sensor networks. Hence this scheme is not suitable. The
self-enforcing scheme depends on asymmetric cryptography,
such as key agreement using public key certificates. However,
limited computation and energy resources of sensor nodes
often make it undesirable to use public key algorithms, such
as RSA[2] or Diffie-Hellman key agreement [3]. The third
type of key agreement scheme is key pre-distribution which is
nothing but symmetric key cryptography. This scheme is most
widely used and suitable for sensor networks.
The secret keys are stored in the ROMs of sensor nodes prior
to deployment. The keys stored must be carefully selected so
as to increase the probability that two neighboring nodes have
atleast one key in common. Nodes that do not share a key
directly must be able to establish a key path where each pair
of nodes in the path shares a key.
There are a number of approaches to key pre-distribution.
One naive approach is to store a master key in each of
the nodes. The nodes use this master key to obtain a new
pairwise key. Though it is simple to implement, it has a
major disadvantage of single point of failure. If an intruder
compromises a node, he is in possession of the master key
with which he can compromise the whole network. Hence,
this scheme is not resilient. Another approach is to store a set
of N − 1 keys in each node where one key is known only
to one of the N − 1 nodes (Assuming there are N nodes in
the network). This scheme overcomes the resilience problem
discussed in the previous scheme, since the capture of a single
node will not reveal the secret keys between any pair of nodes.
However, if the number of nodes increases, the set of keys
to be stored in each node increases proportionally. Since the
nodes have limited memory this scheme becomes impractical
because N could be large. Moreover, if there are more nodes
to be added to the network, the set of keys stored in the nodes
have to be updated to include the keys for the new nodes.
Eschenauer et al.[4] proposed a random key pre-distribution
scheme. In this scheme hundreds of keys are picked from a
key pool and are preloaded in the sensor nodes. The keys
along with their identities form the key-chains. The nodes
exchange their key identities. They propose to employ Merkle
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puzzle [5] to secure the key identities. However, the processing
at each node increases. They show that for a key pool size
of 10000, a key chain of length 75 is enough to obtain
connection probability of 0.5. An enhancement to this scheme
was proposed by Chan et al.[6]. In this scheme q-common keys
are required instead of 1 to be able to increase the security of
the communication. However this scheme requires larger key
chains and smaller key pool compared to the previous scheme.
Random-pairwise key scheme is a modification over pair-
wise key scheme. Each node stores a random set of np
pairwise keys instead of n − 1 where n is the number of
sensor nodes in the network and p is the probability that two
nodes are connected. Blom proposed a scheme that allows
any pair of nodes to find a pairwise secret key between them.
Compared to (N−1)-pairwise key distribution scheme, Blom’s
scheme uses λ+1 memory space where λ is much smaller than
N . Unlike (N − 1)-pairwise key distribution scheme, Blom’s
scheme is not perfectly resilient against node capture. Instead,
it has λ secure property: as long as an adversary captures less
than or equal to λ nodes; uncompromised nodes are perfectly
secure; when an adversary captures more than λ nodes all the
nodes in the network are compromised. Blom’s scheme uses
one key pool to pick the keys. An extension to this scheme
was proposed by Varshney et al. in [7] where multiple key
spaces are incorporated.
One disadvantage of these random approaches is that the
probability of success is low. Lee and Stinson[8] and Campete
and Yener [9] proposed deterministic approach to key distribu-
tion using combinatorial design techniques to allocate keys to
nodes such that the probability of key share between any two
nodes is 1. The amount of memory required per node is some
fractional power of the overall network size. The drawback of
this scheme is that the same keys are shared between many
pair of nodes leading to weaker resilience to node capture.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II
gives a background of few of the topics required for under-
standing this paper. Section III gives the mapping between
symmetric design and key distribution and also highlights the
construction. Section IV gives the analysis and section V gives
some results comparing the proposed symmetric design with
multiple key-spaces and existing symmetric design with single
key-space.
A. Our contribution
We use deterministic approach for key generation using a
block design technique called symmetric Balanced Incomplete
Block Design (BIBD). The main contribution to this work
is the use of multiple key spaces to decrease the memory
utilization and still retain connectivity without hampering the
resilience of the network.
II. BACKGROUND
The definitions of some of the terms used in this paper are
listed below:
A. Key pool
A pool from which keys are picked is called a key pool. It
is analogous to the universal set from which sets are formed.
Example 1: Let key pool, P = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13}
B. Key-space
A subset of the key pool which is used to construct
key-chains for the sensor nodes is called as a key-space.
We know that 2n subsets exist for a set containing n elements.
Hence, for a key pool containing n elements 2n key-spaces
can be constructed.
Example 2: For the key pool P having 13 elements,
213 key-spaces can be constructed. Each Key space is
constructed using some criteria. Lets say, the key-spaces,
KS1 = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7}, KS2 = {1,3,5,7,9,11,13} and KS3 =
{8,9,10,11,12,13} are 3 key-spaces used by a designer.
C. Key-chain
A set of keys assigned to each sensor node is called as
key-chain. Key-chains are subsets of key-spaces.
Example 3: Two key-chains formed from KS1 are k1 =
{1,2,3}, k2 = {1,4,5} and are assigned to sensor nodes
numbered N1, N2. k3 = {1,7,9}, k4 = {9,11,13} and k5 =
{3,5,7} are key-chains formed from KS2 and are assigned to
sensor nodes N3, N4, N5.
D. Key-path
Sensor nodes that do not share a key directly may use a
path where each pair of nodes on the path shares a key. Such
a path is called as a key-path.
Example 4: If sensor nodes N1 and N2 has to communicate,
they find 1 as the common key in their key-chains. Hence
they use 1 as the secret key for their communication. Suppose
N1 and N4 has to communicate, there is no common key in
their key-chains. In such a case we say that there exists a
key-path from N1 to N4 via N3. This is because N1 and N3
share 1 as common key and N3 and N4 share 9 as common
key. The network formed with these five nodes is as shown
in figure 1.
E. BIBD
A Balanced Incomplete Block Design (BIBD) [10] is an
arrangement of v distinct objects into b blocks such that
each block contains exactly k distinct objects, each object
occurs in exactly r different blocks, and every pair of distinct
objects occurs together in exactly λ blocks. The design can be
expressed as (v, k, λ), or equivalently (v, b, r, k, λ), where:
λ (v − 1) = r(k − 1) and bk = vr.
A BIBD is called Symmetric BIBD or Symmetric Design
when b = v and therefore r = k. A Symmetric Design has
four properties: every block contains k = r elements, every
280
  
Fig. 1. Sensor network with 5 nodes
element occurs in r = k blocks, every pair of elements occurs
in λ blocks and every pair of blocks intersect in λ elements.
Example 5: Consider (v, k, λ) = (7,3,1), or equivalently
(v, b, r, k, λ) = (7, 7, 3, 3, 1), Symmetric Design. Lets
consider key-space, KS1 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} having v =
7 objects. There are b = 7 blocks and each block contains
k = 3 objects. Every object occurs in r = 3 blocks. Every
pair of distinct objects occurs in λ = 1 blocks and every
pair of blocks intersects in λ = 1 objects. The blocks of the
Symmetric Design are:
{1, 2, 3}, {1, 4, 5}, {1, 6, 7}, {2, 4, 6}, {2, 5, 7}, {3, 4, 7},
{3, 5, 6}.
F. Latin square
A Latin Square on n symbols is an n×n arrangement such
that each of the n symbols occurs exactly once in each row
and in each column where n is the order of the square.
Example 6: A Latin square on 4 symbols, {1, 2, 3, 4}, is a
4× 4 array shown below:⎛
⎜⎜⎝
1 2 3 4
2 1 4 3
3 4 1 2
4 3 2 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
G. Orthogonal Latin Squares
The Latin Squares A = (aij) and B = (bij), each of order n
are orthogonal if all entries of the join of A and B are distinct.
H. MOLS
Latin Squares A1, A2, ..., Ar are Mutually Orthogonal
Latin Squares (MOLS) if they are orthogonal in pairs.
I. Complete Set
For prime power n, a set of (n − 1) MOLS of order n is
called a Complete Set [10,11].
Example 7: For n = 4, there exists three MOLS each of order
4 that forms a complete set.
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
1 2 3 4
2 1 4 3
3 4 1 2
4 3 2 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
1 2 3 4
4 3 2 1
2 1 4 3
3 4 1 2
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
1 2 3 4
3 4 1 2
4 3 2 1
2 1 4 3
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
J. Projective Plane
A Projective Plane is an abstract mathematical concept and
can be defined as a set of lines and a set of points, the relation
between the lines and points being called as incidence and
satisfying the following properties:
• Given any two distinct points, there is exactly one line
incident with both of them.
• Given any two distinct lines, there is exactly one point
incident with both of them.
• There are four points such that no line is incident with
more than two of them.
In other words, we can say that a projective plane of order
q > 1 is such that;
• Any line is incident with q + 1 points.
• Any point is incident with q + 1 lines.
• There exists q2 + q + 1 points and the same number of
lines.
The smallest possible Projective plane is the Fano plane as
shown in figure 2 . It has seven lines and seven points. It is
a projective plane of order q = 2. Any line is incident with
2 + 1 = 3 points. Any point is incident with 2 + 1 = 3 lines.
There exists 22 + 2 + 1 = 7 points and an equal number of
lines.
  
Fig. 2. Fano plane
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III. COMBINATORIAL BASED KEY GENERATION
In the following sections, we describe the use of combina-
torics in generation of key-chains for sensor nodes in sensor
networks.
A. Mapping
We are interested in constructing Finite Projective Plane
of order m which is nothing but a (m2 + m + 1,m + 1, 1)
symmetric design.
We assume that the sensor nodes are deployed in large
numbers randomly and the key-chains are stored in the ROMs
of the nodes prior to deployment. Let N be the number of
nodes in the network. Each sensor node has K keys in its
key-chain. The K keys are selected from a Key-space KS
which is a subset of the Key Pool P . Each node has to share
λ keys to communicate securely.
If the sensor network contains N nodes, N number of key-
chains has to be generated, i.e., a symmetric design with b ≥
N blocks needs to be generated from an object set S. We
now partition the nodes into a kn number of groups. Each
node belonging to one group will pick the key-chain from the
corresponding key-space. For example, if a node N1 belong to
group k3, it will be deployed with a key-chain picked randomly
from the 3rd key-space KS3. Hence kn is also the number of
key spaces generated for the network of size N .
Let m be a prime power such that there are m2 + m + 1
nodes present in each group. Hence we construct a symmetric
design with v = b = m2 + m + 1 objects and blocks for the
corresponding key-space. We can map the object set S of the
symmetric design to the key pool P . A subset of the object
set forms the key-space KS. The blocks b can be mapped to
the key-chains K . Hence the number of blocks is equal to the
number of key-chains, also equal to number of sensor nodes
corresponding to a key-space. The objects in the block can be
mapped to the keys in the key-chain. This provides b ≥ N
key-chains each having K = k = m2+m+1 keys in its key-
chain. From the property of (m2 + m + 1,m + 1, 1) design,
each pair of blocks can share λ = 1 object. This means, each
pair which picked its key-chain from the same key-space has
λ = 1 keys in common. The mapping is as shown in the Table
1.
B. Construction
To generate a (m2 + m + 1,m + 1, 1) design we use the
following approach. First, we generate a complete set of (m−
1) MOLS of order m. This can be used to construct a Affine
plane of order m which makes it a (m2,m, 1) design. This can
be converted to a projective plane which is a (m2+m+1,m+
1, 1) design. The construction process can be summarized as
follows:
1) Given N , the number of nodes in the network, find a
prime power n where n2 + n + 1 ≥ N.
2) Find a suitable value for prime power m and the
corresponding value of kn.
3) Generate a complete set of (m− 1) MOLS or order m
[10, Appendix A]
TABLE I
MAPPING FROM SYMMETRIC DESIGN TO KEY GENERATION.
Symmetric Design Key Generation
Object Set (S) Key Pool (P )
Subset of Object Set (KS) Key-spaces (KS)
Subset size (|KS| = Key-space size |KS|
v = m2 + m + 1)
Number of subsets (kn) Number of key-spaces (kn)
Blocks Key-chains
Number of blocks (b = m2 + m Number of Key-chains
+1)
Number of blocks (b = m2 + m Number of sensor nodes under
+1) each key-space
Number of objects in a block Number of keys in key-
(k = m + 1) chain
Number of blocks that an Number of key-chains
object is in (r = m + 1) that a key is in
Two blocks belonging to the Two key-chains belonging
same subset share λ = 1 to the same key-space
objects share λ = 1 keys
4) Construct a Affine plane of order m from the MOLS
[10]
5) Construct a Projective plane of order m by adding a
point at infinity to the affine plane [10, Appendix B]
6) Repeat the steps 4 and 5 kn times, i.e., for each key-
space.
There are a number of ways in deciding the value of m and
kn. The approach we adopted was to find the value iteratively.
We begin with the value of m = n/2 and compute the number
of key-spaces necessary to form the required number of key-
chains. That is, find kn such that kn(m2 + m + 1) ≥ N .
Repeat the above process for prime powers less than m such
that kn(m2+m+1)−N is a feasible value. The value kn(m2+
m+1)−N is the number of extra key-chains generated by the
design. Stop the iteration when this value becomes reasonably
small. Since the iterations cannot be carried out indefinitely,
we stop at four iterations and choose the value for m and kn
which gave the least value for kn(m2 + m + 1)−N .
The key-spaces are constructed such that any pair of key-
spaces do not form a disjoint set. A pair of nodes which picked
its key-chain from different key-spaces may or may not contain
a key in common. Since, the key-spaces are non-disjoint, there
exists a key-path of length greater than 1, if not a direct path.
Thus formed projective planes for each of the values kn
becomes the required key-chains.
IV. ANALYSIS
In the modified symmetric design, any pair of blocks chosen
from a single key-space has atleast one object in common ,i.e.,
any pair of key-chains chosen from a single key-space has
atleast one key in common. The key-spaces are constructed
such that two neighboring nodes whose key-chains are taken
from different key-spaces have either a key in common or
there exists a key-path between them. Hence, the probability
of key share between any pair of nodes is 1. This implies that
any two nodes can communicate securely.
Resilience can be defined as resistance against node capture.
Compromise of security credentials, which are stored on
282
a sensor node or exchanged over radio links, should not
reveal information about security of any other links in the
network. Usually higher resilience means lower number of
compromised links [12]. An attacker may be able to monitor
the network and capture the nodes wisely or he may capture
the nodes randomly. Say, an attacker tries to capture the nodes
which have the same specific key in their key-chains. From
the properties of symmetric design, for a single key space, we
know that there are m + 1 keys in the key-chain. Every pair
of keys can occur in exactly one key-chain within that key
space. Hence every kn(m2 + m) keys must be pairing with
the specific key in these kn(m + 1) key-chains. So, a wise
attacker needs to capture kn(m+1) key-chains to compromise
the entire network. But, if the attacker is unlucky and selects
the nodes randomly. He might be capturing those kn(m2) key-
chains which do not pair with the specific key. Hence, he has to
capture one more key-chain in each key-space to compromise
the whole network. Therefore, an unlucky attacker will need
to capture kn(m2 +1) key-chains to be able to recover all the
keys or in other words, to compromise the entire network.
V. RESULTS
With multiple key spaces the length of the key chain is
m + 1, which would have been n + 1 in symmetric design
which uses single key-space. Since m < n/2, the key chain
length is very much reduced. This is a main advantage since
the sensor nodes have limited memory. Even though the key
chain length is reduced, the network remains connected with
a high probability. The comparison of key-chain lengths for
different number of nodes in the sensor network in case of
both symmetric design with single key-space and symmteric
design with multiple key-spaces is shown in figure 3.
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Fig. 3. Comparison of key-chain length
With the use of multiple key spaces, resilience of the
network is not hampered. When a node is compromised the
intruder has keys taken from one particular key-space. This
information is not sufficient to comprise other parts of the
network. Hence, he has to compromise more number of nodes
to get enough keys to capture the entire network. The graph
in figure 4 shows that the minimum number of nodes to be
compromised is almost the same in symmetric design with
single key-space and in symmetric design with multiple key-
spaces.
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The combinatorial design generates more number of key-
chains than the number of nodes in the sensor network. An
efficient algorithm design should be such that the number
of extra key-chains generated is as small as possible. This
will ensure that unnecessary computations are avoided. The
comparison of this computational overhead is shown in figure
5.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The novel idea brought in by this paper is the use of multiple
key-spaces instead of a single key-space in the construction of
key-chains. Adding to the advantage of using a deterministic
approach, we have a few more results derived which prove that
this method is better than using a single key-space. Generation
of each key-space is left as a part of implementation. The more
is the complexity involved in the key-space generation from
the key-pool, the better this method proves out to be. The
concept of kn(> 1) key-spaces itself proves lesser memory
utilization, connectivity in the network and yet have the same
network resilience. There exists no dependency between the
number of keys in the key-chain and the number of nodes in
the network.
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APPENDIX A
Theorem 1 A complete set of (n − 1) MOLS exists
whenever n is prime.
Proof We define square arrays A1, A2, ..., An−1 as
follows. For the (i, j)th entry of Ak, take a
(k)
ij = ki + j,
reduced to modulo n to lie in the set 1,...,n
1) We first check that Ak is a Latin square. First, the entries
in the ith row are all different; for if a(k)ij =a
(k)
iJ then ki
+ j ≡ ki + Jmod(n) whence j = J . Secondly, entries
in the jth column are all distinct; for if a(k)ij = a
(k)
IJ
then ki+ jkI + jmod(n) whence k(i− I) ≡ 0mod(p).
Thus p divides k(i− I), whence p divides i− I , so that
i ≡ Imod(p) and i must equal I .
2) To check if Ak and Ah are orthogonal whenever k = h.
Suppose a(k)ij = a
(k)
IJ and a
(h)
ij = a
(h)
IJ . Then ki + j ≡
kI + J and hi + j ≡ hI + Jmod(n). Subtracting one
from the other gives (h − k)i ≡ (h − k)Imod(n) and,
as above this gives i = I . Substituting back now, this
gives j ≡ Jmod(n) whence j = J .
APPENDIX B
To constrcut a projective plane of order n given a complete
set of MOLS of order n.
Steps Let there be a given a complete set of MOLS of
order n. Then we can create a n2 × (n + 1) matrix (aij)
as follows: The first two columns of the matrix form a
succession of ordered pairs, namely, (0,0), (0,1),...,(0,n-1),
(1,0), (1,1),..., (1,n-1),...,(n-1,0), (n-1,1),...,(n-1,n-1). The third
column repeats the entries of the Latin square A1 by reading
it row by row from left to right. The fourth column does the
same for Latin square A2 and so on.
Label the n2 row-vectors of (aij) as ‘points’ of our
projective plane. Create (n + 1) ‘ideal points’ and label them
z1, z2, ..., zn+1. Altogether we now have n2 + n + 1 points.
The ‘lines’ of the plane are stipulated as follows.
First, there is an ‘ideal line’, called L, defined as the set
{z1, z2, z3, ..., zn+1}. The remaining n2 + n lines (called
‘ordinary lines’) are labeled ij, where i = 0, 1, 2,..,(n − 1),
j = 1, 2,...,(n + 1). Each such line ij is the set
{zj , those ’points’ (= row-vectors) which have i in their jth
column}.
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